HABEAS CORPUS-ABUSE OF THE WRIT-PETITIONER RAISING
CLAIM IN SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION NOT ADVANCED IN PRIOR PETITION MUST SHOW
CAUSE FOR FAILING TO BRING CLAIM PREVIOUSLY AND PREJUDICE THEREFROM-McCIeskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).

Any person who claims to be held in custody by a state government in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States may file an independent civil lawsuit in federal
court seeking a writ of habeas corpus' contesting the validity of
his detention.' There are a number of procedural requirements,
however, that must be fulfilled by any prisoner seeking habeas
relief.3 One of the most basic of these obliges a petitioner to
include all possibly meritorious federal constitutional claims of
which he or she is aware in the first habeas corpus petition.4 If a
petitioner attempts in his second petition to raise claims that
were either already adjudicated or not alleged in his first petition, 5 the judge may, in certain circumstances, dismiss the appli1 YALE KAMISAR ET. AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1546 (7th ed. 1990).
The writ of habeas corpus is a judicial order that directs the person holding the

petitioner to allow the court to consider the legality of the petitioner's conviction.
Id. See generally Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991
(1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.

748 (1987). Because the writ provides individuals with protection against wrongful
and arbitrary imprisonment, it is natural that habeas has long been considered "the
.great writ of liberty.'"

Id. at 749 (quoting WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980)).

2 Prisoners held in state custody can seek federal court relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. section 2254. Id. at 1578. In referring to "the writ of habeas corpus" or to
"the writ," this Note refers only to section 2254 proceedings. Section 2254(a)
states:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
3 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION § 15.3 (1989 & Supp.

1 1990). Procedural requirements mandate that the petitioner: (1) be held in custody in violation of federal law; (2) sign an application in writing and file it with any
federal court; and (3) exhaust all state remedies before filing. See §§ 28 U.S.C.
2254, 2241, 2242 & 2254(b).
4 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 9.5, at 129-30 (1988).
5 See Steven M. Goldstein, Application of ResJudicata Principles to Successive Federal
Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Searchfor an Equitable Approach, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 45 (1987). The failure to assert a new ground in a second or subsequent petition amounts to an attempt to file successive petitions, or, what some
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cation as an abuse of the writ.6
For some time, the abuse of the writ doctrine has come
under attack for failing to prevent genuinely abusive petitions. 7
Dissatisfaction has increased in recent years because of perceived
abuse of the writ by prisoners petitioning under a sentence of
commentators refer to as "same-claim" successive petitions. See id. at 54 (distinguishing between petitions raising new claims and petitions raising claims previously resolved); Liebman, supra note 4, § 27, at 423 n.7 (new claim and same claim
relitigation receive different treatment). This Note adopts the terminology of
"same-claim" and "new-claim" successive petitions to distinguish between second
and subsequent petitions alleging claims already presented and determined (sameclaim), and those alleging claims not previously adjudicated (new-claim).
6 Goldstein, supra note 5, at 70-73. Currently, two statutory provisions govern
when second and subsequent petitions may be dismissed. Id. First, 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) states:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits ....
a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied...
release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of such person need not be entertained... unless the application alleges and is predicated on a... ground not adjudicated on the
hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court,
justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier
application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1976). Second, Rule 9(b) of the Rules governing proceedings
arising under 28 U.S.C. section 2254 provides:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds
that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior
determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert
those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1976).
7 See, e.g., Price v.Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 296 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Jackson dissented from the majority's holding that the prisoner's
fourth petition was improperly dismissed by the district court. Id. at 286. The Justice emphasized:
This is one of a line of cases by which there is being put into the hands
of the convict population of the country new and unprecedented opportunities to re-try their cases, or to try the prosecuting attorney or
their own counsel, and keep the Government and the courts litigating
their cases until their sentences expire or one of their myriad claims
strikes a responsive chord or the prisoner make [sic] the best of an
increased opportunity to escape. I think this Court, by inflating the
great and beneficent writ of liberty beyond a sound basis, is bringing
about its eventual depreciation.
Id. at 301. See also Honorable Louis E. Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Address Given at the 1947 Annual Conference of the Ninth Circuit, San Francisco, in 7 F.R.D. 313, (1947) ("The recent [Supreme Court] decisions, praiseworthy as they may be for safeguarding and broadening the right to the
writ, nevertheless have stimulated the filing of unmeritorious successive petitions
on behalf of penitentiary inmates.").
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death.' Congress, however, rejected proposed amendments in
1990 that would have made second and subsequent petitions by
death-row prisoners much more difficult to advance. 9 Recently,
in McCleskey v. Zant, '0 the United States Supreme Court set forth
8 See H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. at 119 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6524 (suggesting that current abuse provisions have not satisfactorily prevented death row prisoners from filing second and subsequent petitions in attempting to extend litigation); Liebman, supra note 4, § 2.3, at 9 (Supp.
1991), (critics of habeas assert that filing of successive petitions to put off death
results in abuse and manipulation of habeas remedy); see also Steven M. Goldstein,
Expediting the Federal Habeas Corpus Review Process in Capital Cases: An Examination of
Recent Proposals, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 599 (1990) (detailing the reasons for the proposed changes advanced in 1989); S. 1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
S13480 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("This Nation is
facing a crisis in its criminal justice system . . . evidenced by the glut of habeas
petitions ... , many of which are frivolous and used as a delaying tactic."). But cf.
Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? - A Comment on Recent Proposals To
Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1669 n.23 (1990):
While the number of state prisoners has more than doubled in the
past decade, the number of habeas petitions has remained about constant. In fiscal 1988 only 1.8% of all state prisoners filed habeas petitions and only a handful of these were in death penalty cases.
Furthermore, only 11,747, or 4.9% of the 239,634 civil filings in the
United States District Courts in fiscal year 1988 were habeas actions;
of these, state prisoners initiated only 9,880 or 4.1% of the total.
Id. (citing Marsh & Harris, The Right of Death Sentence Review, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan.
20, 1990, at All, col.l; 1988 Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts Annual Report, App. I, Table C2, at 180, 182).
9 Final Votes in Congress on Key Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1990, at B9, col. 2
(noting that October 28, 1990 Senate and House approved anticrime bill which
deleted death penalty habeas reform); Rehnquist is Still Hopingfor Habeas 'Reform,'
NATIONAL LJ., Jan. 14, 1991, at 5, col. 2 ("During final negotiations on the 1990
omnibus crime bill, the habeas reform provisions were dropped, as were other controversial proposals, in a frenzied effort to enact some crime legislation before the
elections."); Richard C. Reuben, Justices Curtail Habeas Relief in U.S. Courts, L.A.
DAILYJ., Apr. 17, 1991, at 1 ("Last year, Congress refused to adopt the recommendation of a commission appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
chaired by retired Justice Lewis F. Powell that would have, in effect, limited state
prisoners to one crack at federal habeas review."). The commission Reuben referred to was actually the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in June 1988. Goldstein, supra note 8,
at 600-01. With retired Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Lewis
Powell as chairman, the Committee produced the Report on Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989). Id. at 601 n.6. On
November 27, 1989, the American Bar Association, Criminal Justice section, released the results of its study, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
Death Penalty Cases, Recommendations and Report of the ABA Task Force on Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus (1989). Berger, supra note 8, at 1665-66 nn.3 & 9. These
two reports competed for Congressional consideration, with the proposed Senate
bill incorporating aspects of both and the House bill adopting the Powell Committee recommendations in their entirety. Liebman, supra note 4, § 2.3, at 18-20
(Cum. Supp. 1991).
10 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
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a clear standard for determining whether a petitioner who raises
a claim in a second or subsequent petition that was not raised in a
previous petition has abused the writ." The Court enunciated
that a petitioner must show cause for failing to raise the claim
therefrom to maintain a habeas
earlier and prejudice resulting
12
petition in the federal courts.
On May 13, 1978, Warren McCleskey was one of four armed
men who robbed a furniture store in Atlanta, Georgia.' 3 One of
the four shot and killed a policeman who had entered the store
during the commission of the crime, but no witness could determine who fired the gun. 1 4 Although McCleskey initially confessed to his participation in the robbery, he renounced his
confession while on trial for both robbery and murder, and denied all involvement.'"
In attempting at trial to rebut McCleskey's testimony of nonparticipation, the State called Offie Evans, who had occupied the
jail cell next to McCleskey's, as a witness. 16 Evans testified that
McCleskey confessed to him in jail about shooting an officer during the robbery.' 7 Evans also provided a twenty-one page statement to the police, but this document was not introduced at
trial.'" Although McCleskey knew the subject matter of Evans's
See id.
McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. This test, known as the cause and prejudice
standard, was first articulated by the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), but was previously only applied to determine whether a petitioner's failure
to comply with state procedural rules should bar federal habeas review. McCleskey,
Ill S. Ct. at 1470.
'3 McCleskey v. State, 263 S.E.2d 146, 147-48 (Ga. 1980).
14 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1458. An eyewitness testified that one of the robbers
ran from the scene with a pearl-handled pistol. Id. Other witnesses testified that
McCleskey stole a pearl-handled pistol of the same caliber used to kill the officer.
Id. The district court, however, found the evidence surrounding the gun to be conflicting because of testimony that one of McCleskey's co-defendants was the only
person to carry the gun after McCleskey stole it. Id. at 1488 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
15 Id. at 1458. At trial, McCleskey took the stand and offered an alibi defense.
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 346 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
16 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1458. In return for Evans' cooperation and testimony,
a detective promised to "speak a word" for Evans regarding charges that he escaped from a federal halfway house. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 883 (11 th
Cir. 1985)(en banc). This agreement was not disclosed to McCleskey. McCleskey,
111 S. Ct. at 1458.
17 Id. Evans further testified that McCleskey even claimed that he would have
killed a dozen policemen to get out of the store. Id.
18 See id. at 1459. Two weeks before the trial began in August 1978, Evans
signed the 21 page statement and gave it to the Atlanta police department. Id. The
written statement related conversations between McCleskey and Evans as well as
conversations' between McCleskey and another prisoner. Id. It also stated that
''

12
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oral testimony, he and his counsel were unaware of Evans's written statement until after McCleskey filed his first federal petition
nine years later.' 9 McCleskey was convicted of murder and robbery in December 1978 and was given the death penalty.2 °
Affirming the jury verdict on direct appeal, the Supreme
Court of Georgia overruled McCleskey's objection to the introduction of Evans's oral testimony at trial. 2 ' McCleskey argued
that by deliberately withholding Evans's twenty-one page statement from the defense, the State violated his right of access to
favorable evidence in the possession of the prosecution, thereby
inhibiting his defense.22 In denying McCleskey relief, the court
acknowledged that the State did not provide Evans's statement to
the defense, 23 but reasoned that because the evidence was not
exculpatory, the denial did not cause McCleskey any material
prejudice. 24 The United States Supreme Court then denied McCleskey's petition for certiorari.2 5
In January 1981, McCleskey filed a state habeas corpus petition reasserting that the prosecutor withheld favorable evidence 26 and further alleging that the admission of Evans'
Evans pretended he was the uncle of someone in whom McCleskey had confided.
Id. at 1460. Additionally, the statement recounted the presence of state officials
when Evans telephoned McCleskey's girlfriend for him. Id. at 1487. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
19 See id. at 1459. In 1987, the Georgia Supreme Court decided Napper v. Georgia
Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 1987), in which it held that "once the trial has
been held, the conviction affirmed on direct appeal, and any petition or petitions
for certiorari denied (including to the Supreme Court of the United States), the
investigatory file in the case should be made available for public inspection." Id. at
647. This novel interpretation of the Georgia Open Records Act allowed McCleskey to obtain the statement from the Atlanta police. Eric M. Freedman, Habeas
Corpus Cases Rewrote the Doctrine, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S6.
20 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1458.
21 McCleskey v. State, 263 S.E.2d 146, 152 (Ga. 1980).
22 Id. at 149-50. McCleskey based this claim on the Court's holding in Brady v.
Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See McCleskey, 263 S.E.2d at 150. In Brady, the
Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
23 McCleskey, 263 S.E.2d at 150. The prosecutor provided the defense counsel
with his file, but did not include Evans's statement. See id.
24 McCleskey, 263 S.E.2d at 150. In response to McCleskey's argument that he
needed the evidence to prepare a proper defense, the Georgia Supreme Court
stressed that the evidence sought was made up simply of statements made by McCleskey himself. Id. Thus, the Court found that the undisclosed evidence would
not have reduced McCleskey's criminal liability. Id.
25 McCleskey v. Georgia, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
26 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1458. McCleskey's amended petition challenged his
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testimony at trial violated the proscription against the use of a
defendant's confession obtained by the State in the absence of
counsel.27 Additionally, McCleskey claimed that the prosecution
violated his due process rights by not disclosing its agreement
with Evans to drop certain charges against him in exchange for
his testimony.28 The state court denied habeas relief on all of
McCleskey's claims.29
In his first federal petition filed in December 1981, McCleskey reasserted that the State unconstitutionally withheld
favorable evidence and failed to disclose its agreement with Evans, but he did not allege that his confession was unconstitutionally obtained in the absence of counsel. 30 After hearings in 1983,
the district court held that McCleskey's due process rights had
been violated through the non-disclosure of the State's agreement with Evans. 3 ' Because the district court believed that Evans's testimony at trial could have affected the jury's verdict, it
granted habeas corpus relief 32 The court of appeals reversed,
murder conviction on 23 grounds. Id. Three of these claims involved Evans' testimony. Id.
27 Id. at 1459. In raising this claim, McCleskey relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at
1459. Under Massiah, a petitioner is denied the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel guarantee if,
after indictment and in the absence of counsel, government agents
deliberately elicit from the defendant incriminating statements which are used
against the defendant at trial. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
28 McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1458. McCleskey based this argument on Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), where the Court held that the jury must be made
aware of any promises which induce the testimony of a key government witness.
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 381 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (quoting United States v.
Cawley, 481 F.2d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 890 F.2d 343 (11th Cir. 1989),
aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991)).
29 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1459. Following this decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court denied McCleskey's petition for a probable cause certificate and the United
States Supreme Court denied his second petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. (citing
McCleskey v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981)).
30 Id.
31 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 384 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd, 890 F.2d 343
(11th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991). The district court found the statement made by the detective to Evans-that he would "speak a word" for him regarding the charges that he escaped from a federal halfway house-amounted to a
promise of favorable treatment and the nondisclosure of that promise to McCleskey
violated Giglio. Id. at 380-82. Although Evans denied at trial that any promises
regarding those charges had been made, id. at 381, the prosecutor contacted federal authorities after the trial and the charges against Evans were dropped. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 883 (11 th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
32 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 384. A Giglio error will be deemed harmless unless
there is a reasonable likelihood that the judgment of the jury was affected by the
nondisclosure. See Giglio v.United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). In this case,
the district court described Evans' testimony as '.'highly damaging," and found that
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holding that the State's promise to Evans did not amount to an
infraction of due process33 and, moreover, that any such error
was harmless.3 4 The United
States Supreme Court granted certi35
relief.
all
denied
and
orari
Finally, in July 1987, McCleskey filed his second federal
habeas petition with the district court including a claim that the
confession to Evans was unconstitutionally obtained in the absence of counsel.3 6 McCleskey was prompted to file this second
petition after learning of Evans's twenty-one page written statement in June 1987. s7 The State argued that allowing McCleskey
to bring this claim in his second federal habeas petition would be
an abuse of the writ. 38 The district court rejected the State's argument, finding that McCleskey had not deliberately abandoned
the claim after alleging it in the first state habeas corpus proceeding.3 9 The district court concluded that McCleskey's right to
"Evans' testimony was by far the most damaging testimony on the issue of malice."
McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 381, 382. The district court concluded that "the jury may
reasonably have reached a different verdict on the charge of malice murder had the
promise of favorable treatment been disclosed." Id. at 383.
33 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 884 (11 th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The court
of appeals found that the detective's statement to Evans offered only a marginal
benefit and would not have motivated a reluctant witness to testify. Id. Moreover,
the court concluded that the statement would not have affected Evans's credibility
with the jury. Id.
34 Id. The court of appeals found that there was no reasonable likelihood that
the nondisclosure affected the jury's decision. Id. at 885. Two jury members, however, have since come forward and stated that their ignorance of Evans's relationship with the police tainted their sentencing of McCleskey and that they no longer
supported an execution. Georgia Inmate is Executed After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A18, col. 1. Nevertheless, McCleskey was executed on
September 25, 1991. Id.
35 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the capital sentencing procedures in Georgia were constitutional.
See id. The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia capital punishment scheme as constitutional in the face of an equal protection challenge based upon the disproportionate imposition of death sentences upon blacks and upon persons who murder
whites. Id. at 292. Rejecting powerful statistics of this disproportion developed by
Professor Baldus, the Court posited: "to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause,
[a defendant] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court also rejected McCleskey's
Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the statistics generated by Professor Baldus
did not establish a "constitutionally unacceptable risk" that racial prejudice affected
the sentencing decision, given other safeguards built into the system. Id. at 313.
36 McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1459 (1991). See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Massiah claim.
37 Id. at 1459. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
38 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1460.
39 Id. The district court found that McCleskey had not attempted to reserve his
proof or deliberately withhold the Massiah claim for the second petition. Id. The
district court also determined that McCleskey did not know the Evans document
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State had obcounsel was violated by the manner in which the
40
tained the confession and granted habeas relief.
In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the failure to dismiss McCleskey's claim as abusive of the writ constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of
the district court. 4 1 The court of appeals found that by including
the right to counsel claim in the state habeas petition, dropping it
in the first federal petition, and reasserting it again in the second
federal petition, McCleskey necessarily abandoned the claim deliberately. 42 The court further asserted that if any violation of
McCleskey's right to counsel occurred, the error it caused was
existed when he filed his first petition and that the failure to discover the document
before 1987 could not be attributed to McCleskey's inexcusable neglect. Id. Moreover, the district court maintained that the Massiah claim had been dropped after
the first state habeas corpus proceeding "because it was obvious that it could not
succeed given the then-known facts." McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 343, 348-49
(1 th Cir. 1989) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D.Ga. filed Dec.
23, 1987)).
40 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1460. The district court's hearings focused on the jailcell arrangements that had taken place in 1978. See id. The court noted that after
obtaining the Evans document and filing the second petition, McCleskey's counsel
contacted Ulysses Worthy, a jailer in whose office the police took Evans's 1978
statement. Id. Worthy testified that Evans was deliberately moved to be near McCleskey's cell. See id. The district court found that the Evans document contained a
strong indication of an early relationship between Evans and the police. Id. Additionally, the district court reasoned that Worthy's testimony further suggested that
the police used Evans to elicit incriminating statements from McCleskey. Id. The
district court concluded that Evans had been placed next to McCleskey for the purpose of obtaining incriminating information from McCleskey, that Evans was given
facts unknown to the public from the police and that Evans was coached by the
police on how to approach McCleskey. Id.
41 McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 343, 344 (11 th Cir. 1989). In arguing that the
district court abused its discretion, the court of appeals stated:
Whether a second or subsequent petition is to be dismissed on abuse
of the writ grounds is left to the sound discretion of the district court.
Yet discretion in such matters is not unfettered, and its sound exercise
will rarely permit a district court to hear a petition that clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ.
d. at 347 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 349. The court of appeals concluded that the district court's finding
that McCleskey was not aware of Evans's written statement until 1987 was not
clearly erroneous. Id. at 348. The court of appeals, however, did find that McCleskey "made a knowing choice not to pursue the claim after having raised it previously. This constitutes prima facie evidence of deliberate abandonment." Id. at
349. Although the lawyer who represented McCleskey in the first federal habeas
proceeding testified that he was not confident about the likelihood of success on a
Massiah claim, see id. at 350, the court of appeals held that "abandoning a claim after
initial investigatory efforts prove unsuccessful cannot insulate a petitioner from
abuse of the writ." Id. Stressing that Evans's statement "was simply the catalyst
that caused counsel to pursue the Massiah claim more vigorously," the court of
will only be possible to avoid piecemeal litigation if counsel
appeals stated that "[ilt
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harmless.43
McCleskey petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari. 4 The Court granted the petition and specifically
asked the parties to consider whether a petitioner must deliberately abandon a claim to abuse the writ. 45 In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the Court definitively stated that an
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus exists where the petitioner,
through inexcusable neglect, failed to raise the claim in the first
petition. 46 The Court further explained that the petitioner has
the burden of showing cause for not raising the claim earlier and
prejudice resulting therefrom.47 Concluding that McCleskey had
not met this burden, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' rul48
ing that he abused the writ.

At early common law, there was virtually no limit to how
many successive habeas petitions a prisoner could bring. 49 Even
the doctrine of res judicata 50 did not prohibit the repeated review
of the same claims by different tribunals. 5 ' This was permitted,
at least in part, because prisoners at one time had no rights to
is required to make a thorough investigation of the facts at the time of petitioner's
first petition for habeas corpus." Id.
43 Id. Relying heavily on its own previous discussion of harmless error in the
Giglio context, the court of appeals concluded that "the jury would have convicted
and sentenced McCleskey as it did even without Evans' testimony." McCleskey, 890
F.2d at 353. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
44 McCleskey v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454, 1461 (1991).
45 McCleskey v. Zant, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990). The Court asked the parties to
consider the following question: "Must the State demonstrate that a claim was deliberately abandoned in an earlier petition for a writ of habeas corpus in order to
establish that inclusion of that claim in a subsequent habeas petition constitutes
abuse of the writ?" Id.
46 McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1467-68.
47 Id. at 1470.

48 Id. at 1474.
49 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 5
(1980) ("The common law of England dealt with [the writ of habeas corpus] so
liberally, that the decision of one court or magistrate to refuse to release the prisoner, was no bar to the issuing of a second, third, or additional writ by another
court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the case.").
50 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). ResJudicata requires that a
final judgment on the merits rendered by a court having competent jurisdiction be
determininative as to the parties involved and be an absolute bar to any subsequent
action which involves the same claim. Id.
51 See Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1983) ("historically, resjudicata has
been inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings"); Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122,
124-25 (1968) (per curiam) ("usual principles of resjudicata are inapplicable to successive habeas corpus proceedings"); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)
("The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas .. .is inherent in the very role and
function of the writ."). See also Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.3, at 390-91.
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appeal habeas corpus decisions refusing their requests for discharge.52 Moreover, the interest of protecting the prisoner from
a wrongful deprivation of his constitutional life and liberty rights
was more revered than the interests of achieving finality of judgments. 5 3 Thus, courts and judges exercised independent judgment on each successive habeas application, regardless of how
many had been filed previously.5 4
As the right to appellate review of habeas decisions became
available, however, courts began to question whether the spirit of
habeas corpus required the permitting of endless petitions.5 5 In
1923, the Supreme Court began limiting prisoners' access to successive habeas petitions in Salinger v. Loisel.5 6 In Salinger, the
52 DUKER, supra note 49, at 5-6 ("lilt would have been intolerable for a person to
have the legality of his custody determined by the first judicial body to hear the
matter.").
55 See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 749 (the writ is the most important part of
the Constitution protecting individual's right against wrongful imprisonment);
Liebman, supra note 4, at 386 ("[H]abeas corpus inevitably subordinates the ...
finality policy underlying resjudicata... to... the weightier policy of preserving life
and liberty against lawless deprivation by the States."). Indeed, Justice Brennan
has expressed:
It has been suggested that [the inapplicability of res judicata to habeas
decisions] derives from the fact that at common law habeas corpus
judgments were not appealable. But its roots would seem to go
deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
54 1 W.F. BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES § 59, at 206 (1913).
55 McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1462 (1991). Some courts actually rejected the common-law rule and did consider a denial of habeas corpus to be
barred by res judicata. Id. (citing McMahon v. Mead, 139 N.W. 122, 123 (S.D.
1912); Exparte Heller, 131 N.W. 991, 994 (Wis. 1911); Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga.
598, 603-05 (1879)). Most courts, however, chose a middle ground between endless successive petitions and res judicata, giving effect to res judicata only when the
case had been heard upon the same evidence and where the circumstances and
facts remained the same, but permitting future applications based upon new facts
and evidence. See MXCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1463 (citing Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62
(1889)).
56 265 U.S. 224 (1923). The Salinger Court characterized the motivation for its
decision to place limits on habeas review:
In early times when refusal to discharge was not open to appellate
review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the
number. But when a right to appellate review was given, the reason
for that practice ceased, and the practice came to be materially
changed -just as, when a right to a comprehensive review in criminal
cases was given, the scope of inquiry deemed admissible on habeas
corpus came to be relatively narrowed.
Id. at 230-31.
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Court held that when a prisoner raises issues in a second or subsequent petition that were considered and determined in a previous application, the prior adverse adjudication may be given
"controlling weight" in deciding whether to entertain the second
or subsequent petition. 57 By refusing to apply the strict doctrine
of res judicata, the Court affirmed the privileged status of the writ
of habeas corpus. 5" The Court recognized limits to this privilege,
however, by permitting a judge to give controlling weight to a
prior, thoroughly considered disposition by an authorized
court.59 Thus, the Court instituted a guard against abusive uses
of the writ.'
The Court continued to limit successive habeas petitions to
some extent in a case decided on the same day as Salinger: Wong
Doo v. United States.6 In Wong Doo, the, Court considered whether
a second petition could be dismissed for raising a ground that
57 Id. at 231. In reaching its decision, the Court stated: "the officers before
whom the second application is made may take into consideration the fact that a
previous application had been made to another officer and refused; and in some
instances that fact may justify a refusal of the second." Id. (quoting Ex ParteCuddy,
40 F. 62 (1889)).
58 Id. at 232.
59 See id. The Court perceived a need to "accord to the writ of habeas corpus its
recognized status as a privileged writ of freedom, and yet make against an abusive
use of it." Id. The Court continued that to achieve this balance, it reserved the
right to require habeas corpus applicants to disclose whether a prior application
was made and what ruling was accorded thereto. Id.
60 Id. Congress, in the first legislation to address repetitive federal habeas petitions, enacted 28 U.S.C. section 2244(a) to address second and subsequent petitions raising claims that had been previously adjudicated. Id. This provision
provided, in pertinent part:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, if it
appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a
judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of
habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge of court is satisfied that
the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1948). Thus, Congress permitted ajudge, convinced that justice would not be served by reaching the merits of a habeas application, to dismiss
the petition if it failed to present grounds not previously presented and determined. See id. The Reviser's Note to Section 2244 clarified Congress's intent not to
disturb the evolution of common law abuse of the writ principles. McCleskey v.
Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1465 (1991). Therefore, although one could possibly
surmise that congressional permission to dismiss petitions raising no new grounds
necessarily implied a determination that petitions presenting new grounds could
not be dismissed, the Court rejected this reading in its first authoritative interpretation of the statute. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963). For a discussion of Sanders, see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
61 265 U.S. 239 (1923).
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was alleged, but not decided, in a previous petition.62 In denying
the writ, the Court refused to allow the petitioner to postpone
the resolution of the issue in the first habeas proceeding by failing to present proof of the claim at that time.6" The Court explained that the petitioner had already advanced the same
ground in the first petition, but he presented no evidence then
for support.6 The Court stressed that the petitioner had a full
opportunity to proffer evidence at the first hearing and good
faith demanded that he should have adduced the proof then.65
The Court reasoned that to permit the reservation of proof for
later petitions would effectively allow prisoners to postpone the
execution of their convictions indefinitely.66 Therefore, the
Court held that the petitioner abused the writ.6 7
Twenty-three years later in Price v. Johnston,68 the Court tempered the movement toward restricting successive habeas petitions by establishing that a petitioner is not necessarily required
to raise all his allegations in the first habeas proceeding. 69 In
Price, the Court addressed whether a claim raised for the first
time in a subsequent petition was abusive of the writ. 70 The
Court further delineated the scope of habeas corpus review by
stating that a petitioner who presents justifiable reasons for not
raising a claim in an earlier petition will be granted habeas relief.7 ' The Court acknowledged the many problems caused by
the increasing number of successive habeas petitions by prisoners, 72 but asserted that the need to prevent unjust imprisonment
62 See id. at 241. While Salinger presented a claim which had been both alleged
and decided in a prior petition, Wong Doo involved a claim that was alleged in the
first petition but not decided.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id.
68
69

334 U.S. 266 (1948).

See id.
70 Id. at 289. The Court distinguished Salinger, upon which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had relied, reasoning that the Salinger holding applied only to
successive habeas corpus petitions that raised the same issues. Id. The Price Court
found that because the fourth petition raised an issue not raised previously, "three
prior refusals to discharge [the] petitioner [could] have no bearing or weight on the
disposition to be made of the new matter raised in the fourth petition." Id. (citing
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1941)). The Supreme Court later contended in
McCleskey that this portion of the Price decision was ignored in the Court's subsequent decisions.
71 Price, 334 U.S. at 291.
72 Id. at 293.
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requires that prisoners be given the opportunity to obtain judicial relief in certain circumstances." Because the petitioner in
Price had not been given an opportunity to explain the reason for
his delay, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court for this factual determination.74
After Price, however, the law remained unclear as to what
constituted a 'justifiable reason" for not bringing a claim in the
first federal habeas petition. 75 Thus, in the seminal decision
Sanders v. United States,7 6 the Court sought to formulate basic rules

for lower courts to follow in determining whether a successive
petition is abusive of the writ 7 7 and articulated a standard for de73 Id. at 291. The Court reminded: "[t]he primary purpose of a habeas corpus
proceeding is to make certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned." Id.
74 Id. at 291-93. Under Price, the government bears the initial burden of pleading abuse of the writ. See id. Accord McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470
(1991); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10 (1963). However, some district
courts have raised the issue of abuse of the writ sua sponte. See, e.g., Jones v. Estelle,
692 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming magistrate's sua sponte dismissal); Thigpen
v. Smith, 792 F.2d 1507, reh'g denied, 798 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring
district courts to raise issue of abuse of writ sua sponte). But see Jane A. Gordon,
Comment, Pleading Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus: Sua Sponte Departure
From Precedent and CongressionalIntent, 38 EMORY L.J. 489 (1989) (abuse of the writ
should be viewed as affirmative defense which must be raised by state and not
raised sua sponte).
75 Then existing federal legislation only addressed same-claim successive petitions. See supra note 60. The Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. section 2255
(1948), which contained a provision similar to section 2244, might govern newclaim successive petitions. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1963). See
infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. Section 2255, which was passed to provide a more convenient mechanism to secure relief typically sought in habeas
corpus proceedings, See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952), provided that a district court could dismiss a second or subsequent petition seeking
similar relief. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 12-13. Noting that a prisoner will almost always
be seeking the same relief (i.e. release from imprisonment), the Court held that
section 2255 had to be considered the equivalent of section 2244 if, in fact, it was to
be constitutional and provide prisoners with the same rights as those offered in
habeas proceedings. Id. at 14. A constitutional question was posed because the
federal Constitution provides: "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Case of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." Id. at 12 n. 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
It is worth noting that under Sanders, a same-claim subsequent petition could
be dismissed if "the ends ofjustice would not be served by reaching the merits of
the application." Id. at 15. Under this test, a court was never obligated to dismiss a
same-claim successive petition. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 702; Liebman, supra
note 4, § 27.1, at 424-26. Subsequently in 1986, a plurality of the Court held in
Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), that same-claim successive petitions may be
entertained by the district court only if the petitioner supplements his constitutional claim with a "colorable showing of factual innocence." Id. at 454.
76 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
77 See id. at 15. See also Goldstein, supra note 5, at 56-57; Liebman, supra note 4,
§ 26.3, at 390; Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 701; Karen C. Lapidus, Note, Rose v.
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termining whether a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief 78 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that a petitioner who
either "deliberately withholds" a claim from his first petition or
"deliberately abandons" a claim that was raised in the first petition may be precluded from raising that claim in a subsequent
petition. 79 The Court expressed that "needless piecemeal litigation... whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay," need not
be tolerated.8 0 Finally, the Court emphasized that trial judges
Lundy and Rule 9(b): Will the Court Abuse the Great Writ, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 335, 349
(1983).
Sanders, together with Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), was the third in a trilogy of decisions in which the Court
attempted to guide lower courts in habeas proceedings. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 23
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent in Sanders-argued that these cases erred in ignoring principles of finality by permitting endless litigation. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Sanders Court stated:
We need not pause over the test governing whether a second or successive application may be deemed an abuse by the prisoner of the
writ or motion remedy. The Court's recent opinions in Fay v. Noia,
and Townsend v. Sain, deal at length with the circumstances under
which a prisoner may be foreclosed from federal collateral relief. The
principles developed in those decisions govern equally here.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). Fay held that a prisoner convicted in state court could
raise issues in a federal habeas corpus proceeding even if those issues were not
raised at trial, so long as he or she had not chosen deliberately to bypass the state
procedures. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). Townsend held that federal
courts have the power to conduct new factual hearings if facts are in dispute and the
state court did not afford the defendant a full and fair hearing. Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
Sanders' reference to Townsend has given some courts justification to adopt the
"inexcusable neglect" language from Townsend in the abuse of the writ context. See
infra notes 132 and 193 for a discussion of this topic.
Also, Fay's deliberate bypass test, never codified by Congress, see infra note
193, no longer controls procedural defaults. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (rejecting Fay's deliberate bypass test and adopting cause and prejudice test
to determine whether district courts can entertain issues raised on habeas not
raised at trial). The rejection of Fay in Sykes, coupled with Sanders' reference to Fay,
has caused at least one court to conclude that Sanders' deliberate withholding test
was replaced by a stricter standard. SeeJones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc), cert. denied 466 U.S. 976 (1984). For criticism of this view, see Liebman, supra note 4, at 392-93 n. 15. ("[T]he better view is that the combination of
Fay and Congress' codification of Sanders' preserves the deliberate withholding rule
in the successive petition context."); L. Yackle, supra note 1, at 563-64 (codification
of Sanders in Rule 9(b) "would surely make any significant departure from present
law difficult"); Goldstein, supra note 5, at 120 (adoption of Sanders' standard in
§ 2244(b) and Rule 9(b) "strongly suggests that Sanders must control.... When the
Court overruled [Fay v.] Noia in Sykes and its progeny, it was not deviating from a
decision the Congress subsequently endorsed. Such would be the case if the Court
departed from Sanders in any significant way.").
78 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17.
79 Id. at 18.
80 Id.
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have the sole discretion in determining whether to dismiss a successive habeas petition.8 '
Three years later, Congress amended habeas corpus legislation governing successive petitions to explicitly address the Sanders issue: second and subsequent petitions raising new claims for
relief.8 2 According to this legislation, a second or subsequent
habeas application need not be entertained unless it alleges a
new ground for relief and the judge believes that the petitioner
did not deliberately withhold the new ground or in some other
way abuse the writ.8 3 The statute provides that, if a petitioner
8 4

meets these conditions, the application must be entertained;
but if the petitioner fails to meet either of these conditions, the
judge may dismiss the petition. 5 Additionally, Rule 9(b) of the
Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings, promulgated ten
years after the revised version of Section 2244, was also enacted
to formally incorporate the common law principles
governing the
86
abuse of the writ doctrine set forth in Sanders.

In the years following the codification of the Sanders principles, the scope of habeas review became somewhat delineated
through the denial of stay applications and petitions for certiorari, as well as through dicta, but the standard was still unclear.8 7
81 Id. The Court stressed that "the federal judge clearly has the power-and, if
the ends ofjustice demand-the duty to reach the merits." Id. at 18-19. This concept, subsequently referred to as the "ends ofjustice inquiry," has been a source of
controversy for the Court, McClesky v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991), but
recently has been interpreted to require a constitutional claim supplemented by a
"colorable showing of factual innocence." See supra note 75. The McCleskey majority found that a federal judge can reach the merits of a claim using the "ends of
justice inquiry" if the alleged constitutional violation has probably "caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime." McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470-7 1.
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1966). See supra note 6 for the full text of this provision. Although the legislative history to section 2244 does not mention Sanders, it
has been universally accepted that this provision did indeed codify Sanders. See infra
note 187.
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 244(b) (1966).
84 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1466. The application must be entertained provided
that other habeas errors, such as procedural default or the non-exhaustion of state
claims, are not present. For a basic discussion of procedural default, see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 694; for a discussion of the exhaustion requirement, see id. at
703.
85 Id. Despite the permissive language of the statute, the McCleskey majority

found that section 2244(b) does not provide any guidance for determining whether
a district court has the power to entertain a petition that fails to meet either of these
criteria. Id. See supra note 60.
86 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1466-67. Both the majority, id., and the dissent, id. at
1480-81, agreed that section 2244(b) and Rule 9(b) codified Sanders. For a discussion of the passage of Rule 9(b), see Gordon, supra note 74, at 500-06.
87 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1461. See also Witt v. Wainwright, 470 U.S. 1039, 1043
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The primary example of the Court's use of dicta to define the
abuse of the writ standard is the plurality opinion of Rose v.
Lundy."8 In Lundy,Justice O'Connor held that a prisoner's habeas
petition that raised some claims for which state remedies had not
been exhausted and some for which state remedies had been exhausted 9 was abusive of the writ and dismissable in its entirety. 90
More importantly, in dictum, Justice O'Connor continued
that if a prisoner were to proceed with the exhausted claims in
federal habeas while pursuing the unexhausted claims in state
court, he would risk dismissal of a subsequent federal petition
raising the newly exhausted claims. 9 ' Justice O'Connor recognized a need to lessen the burden on federal courts by requiring
all claims to be brought in one single habeas petition. 92 A majority of the Court, however, did not agree with Justice O'Connor. 93
Justice Brennan dissented from this portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion, arguing that under Sanders, which the plurality conceded was adopted by Congress, 4 petitions should only
be dismissed as abusive if the petitioner could have brought a
claim in the first petition but chose not to in an attempt to have
multiple habeas opportunities. 95
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court has had little occasion in full opinions to elaborate upon the contours of the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. Instead, the
doctrine develops sub rosa when this Court refuses to stay executions or to consider
substantive claims raised in certiorari petitions that arise from second or later
habeas petitions.").
88 455 U.S. 509 (1982). See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted)
("Subsequent to the adoption of the Habeas Corpus Rules, in only one decision,
Rose v. Lundy, and then only indirectly, has the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of successive federal habeas applications that raise new grounds.").
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988). A federal statute requires that federal courts
not consider claims in habeas petitions for which state remedies have not yet been
exhausted. Id. This section, however, does not discuss how a petition presenting
exhausted and unexhausted claims (a mixed petition) should be treated. See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 79 n.156.
9o Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21. The Court cautioned future defendants and their
counsel: "before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have
taken each one to state court." Id. at 520.
91 Id. Justice O'Connor cited Rule 9(b), Sanders, and Wong Doo to support this
proposition. See id. at 521.

See id. at 520.
See id. at 532-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Four
Justices disagreed with the result suggested by Justice O'Connor, and one dissenting Justice did not take a position on this specific issue. LIEBMAN, supra note 4,
§ 26.7, at 420 n.30; Goldstein, supra note 5, at 80 n.160.
94 Rose, 455 U.S. at 521 (Rule 9(b) incorporated the abuse of the writ principles
set forth in Sanders).
95 Id. at 535-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan stated:
92
93
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Two years later in Stephens v. Kemp,96 a sharply divided
Supreme Court once again demonstrated that the question of
what constitutes an abuse of the writ remained unsettled. 97 In
Stephens, a majority of the Supreme Court granted the stay of execution requested in the petitioner's second habeas application,
but four dissenting Justices" argued that the petition should
have been dismissed. 99 The dissenters posited that a petition
should be denied if it raises issues that were not raised earlier
because of the petitioner's inexcusable neglect.' 0 Under this
harsher standard, the dissent found that the petitioner did not
adequately explain why the newly asserted claim had not been
raised earlier.' 0 '
Three other stay decisions, further demonstrate the direction the Court has recently taken in its abuse of the writ jurisprudence.'0 2 In Woodard v. Hutchins,'l 3 the Court vacated a stay of
execution, emphasizing that all three of the petitioner's claims
presented for the first time in his second federal habeas petition
"could and should have been raised" in the first habeas petiSanders was plainly concerned with "a prisoner deliberately withhold[ing] one of two grounds" for relief "in the hope of being
granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such reason."
Sanders also notes that waiver might be inferred where "the prisoner
deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing." Finally,
Sanders states that dismissal is appropriate either when the court is
faced with "needless piecemeal litigation" or with "collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay." Thus Sanders made it
crystal clear that dismissal for "abuse of the writ" is only appropriate
when a prisoner was free to include all of his claims in his first petition, but knowingly and deliberately chose not to do so in order to get
more than "one bite at the apple." The plurality's interpretation obviously would allow dismissal in a much broader class of cases than
Sanders permits.
Id. (emphasis in original).
96 464 U.S. 1027 (1984).
97 See id.
98 Id. at 1028. Justice Powell was joined in dissent by ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor. Id.
99 Id. at 1029.
100 Id. at 1030. This inexcusable neglect standard first surfaced in the abuse of
the writ context in Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 747 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 877 (1981). Goldstein, supra note 5, at 115 n.352. For criticism of the dissent's adoption of this inexcusable neglect standard in Stephens, see id. at 115-16
(inexcusable neglect standard inconsistent with Sanders, Rule 9(b), and section
2244(b)).
101 Stephens, 464 U.S. at 1031 ("Stephens simply failed to explain his failure to
raise his claim in his first federal habeas petition, and therefore his case comes
squarely within Rule 9(b)."). Id.
102 McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1467 (1991).
I03 464 U.S. 377 (1984).

484

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:467

tion. 10 4 The majority stressed that the federal courts should not
tolerate petitions asserting claims that could have been presented
previously, but that are actually presented only when execution is
imminent.' 0 5 Similarly, in Antone v. Dugger,10 6 the Court denied a
stay application presenting new claims in a second habeas petition. 0 7 The Court affirmed the district court's finding that the
petitioner showed inexcusable neglect in failing to raise the new
claims in the first petition, 0 8 emphasizing that all of the newly
presented claims had been presented in state court prior to the
filing of the first federal habeas petition. 0 9 Finally, in Delo v.
Stokes,"O the Court granted the State's motion to vacate a stay of
execution,"' finding that the petitioner's fourth federal habeas
petition was abusive because the newly raised claims could have
been raised or developed previously."'
104 Id. at 379. Although the Court admitted that there was no affirmative evidence showing that the claims had been deliberately withheld, it stressed that
Hutchins had counsel throughout the case, and no reasons had been given to explain why the claims were not raised earlier. Id. at 379 n.3. While this language
suggests that the Court was basing its decision on the fact that the petitioner bears
the burden of disproving abuse, Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.5, at 406, Justices
White and Stevens argued:
[T]he Court's opaque per curam opinion vacating the stay comes very
close to a holding that a second petition for habeas corpus should be
considered as an abuse of the writ and for that reason need not be
otherwise addressed on the merits. We are not now prepared to accept such a per se rule.
Hutchins, 464 U.S. at 383 (White, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 380. The majority stated its policy rationale for dismissing the petition:
A pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in
which claims that could have been presented years ago are brought
forward-often in a piecemeal fashion--only after the execution date
is set or becomes imminent. Federal courts should not continue to
tolerate-even in capital cases-this type of abuse of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Id.
106 465 U.S. 200 (1984).
107 Id. at 205-06. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, argued that the claims
presented in the second federal habeas petition were essentially the same as those
raised in the first; he dismissed the second petition on this ground. Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 204.
109 Id. at 206.
110 110 S. Ct. 1880 (1990).
111 Id. at 1881. The majority opinion was in the form of aper curiam. Id. Justice
Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at
1882-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority reversed the district court, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the same Court of Appeals sitting en
banc. Id. at 1881. The lower courts had determined that the petitioner had not
abused the writ. Id.
112 Id. The Court asserted that one of Stokes' claims could have been raised in

1992]

NOTE

485

Additionally, the Fourth," 3 Fifth,' ' 4 Eighth," 5 and Eleventh" 6 Circuits have developed an abuse of the writ standard
more strict than that articulated in Sanders-a more objectively
defined inexcusable neglect standard.' ' 7 These circuits" 8 have
the first federal habeas petition, and that the other could have been developed
before the last minute attempt to secure a stay of execution. Id. The Court therefore held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting the stay of
execution. Id. Justice Stevens argued that the district court and the court of appeals, especially when the latter was sitting en bane, were better able to determine
whether the successive petitions constituted an abuse of the writ. Id. at 1884 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further emphasized that abuse of the writ
issues are and should be "addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial
judges." Id. at 1883 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963)).
113 See, e.g., Miller v. Bordenkircher, 764 F.2d 245, 250-52 (4th Cir. 1985) (abuse
found for deliberate withholding or for inexcusable neglect).
"14 See, e.g., Daniels v. Blackburn, 763 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(proper inquiry not whether petitioner intentionally waived claims but whether he
lacked legal excuse for not bringing them initially); Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159,
163 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (abuse if petitioner's failure to bring claim previously
due to inexcusable neglect), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984); Sockwell v. Maggio,
709 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1983)(dismissal for abuse of writ if petitioner deliberately withheld claim or was inexcusably neglectful), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985).
1'5 See, e.g., Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir. 1990)("Our cases
teach us that the procedural-bar 'cause' and 'prejudice' analysis of Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and the 'factual innocence' exception to that analysis also
apply to a State's abuse-of-the-writ defense"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 21 (1990); Hall
v. Lockhart, 863 F.2d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1988) (abuse of the writ analysis "governed
by principles of deliberate bypass and inexcusable neglect").
116 See, e.g., Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (abuse
of writ when petitioner intentionally withheld or abandoned claims or inexcusably
neglected to include them), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct 3255 (1990); Gunn v. Newsome,
881 F.2d 949, 957 (11 th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (abuse of writ inquiry asks whether
petitioner's conduct was result of inexcusable neglect), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 542
(1989); Demps v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1385, 1391 (11 th Cir. 1989) (to avoid dismissal,
petitioner must show that failure to present claim earlier not attributable to intentional abandonment or withholding, or inexcusable neglect); Adams v. Wainwright,
804 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11 th Cir. 1986) (district court may dismiss newly asserted
claim as abusive if failure to assert previously resulted from intentional abandonment or withholding or inexcusable neglect).
117 See Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.6, at 409 (these circuits have adopted objective inexcusable neglect standard Congress explicitly rejected in 1976 when passing
Rule 9(b)); Freedman, supra note 19, at S6 (long before McCleskey, these circuits had
"invented 'objective' tests that attributed to petitioners the knowledge that courts
decided their lawyers should have had"); Legislative Modification of Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Civil Rights 848, 858 (referring to adoption of objective standard by
these circuits as an "outright refusal on the part of some courts to enforce the
law").
118 See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. Execution Update (Sept. 25, 1991) (of
the 155 involuntary executions that have taken place since 1976, 89.7%, or 139,
have occurred in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, or Eleventh Circuits).
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held that a district court may dismiss a second or subsequent petition that raises claims about which a petitioner reasonably
should have known when the prior petition was filed, regardless
of whether the petitioner was actually aware of the claim. 19
Under this standard, these circuits have effectively prevented petitioners from bringing a second or subsequent petition raising
new claims unless justified by newly discovered facts, a change
in
2
the controlling law, or ineffective assistance of counsel. 1
Recently, in 1990,121 Congress considered whether to
amend the legislation governing abuse of the writ determinations
to adopt a more stringent standard than that developed in the
southern circuits. 22 The proposal of these amendments reflected concern that the guidelines set forth in Sanders were not
preventing death-row petitioners from attempting to delay their
executions. 23 More specifically, the amendments proposed the
dismissal of a death row prisoner's subsequent petition unless he
raised a new claim founded upon facts that could not have been
discovered by exercising reasonable diligence. 24 These amend119 Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.6, at 410.
Id. at 411. Professor Liebman criticized the adoption of the objective inexcusable neglect standard as transforming the Sanders test into "the equivalent of the res
judicata doctrine." Id. at 412 n.22. Professor Liebman continued:
By sneaking res judicata notions in through the back door, the three
death penalty circuits effectively have reversed Congress' and the
Supreme Court's assignment of primacy to the writ's " 'purpose... to
make certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned'" and accorded
finality the preferred status. That the southern circuits have accomplished this reversal by adopting a standard Congress expressly rejected the last time it passed legislation in the area and implicitly has
rejected on numerous occasions since then by failing to pass legislation seeking the same result - and that those circuits have directed
the new standard principally at a class of prisoners traditionally accorded legislative exemption from procedural preclusion rules heightens the lawless character of the revision.
Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted).
121 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed
legislation. The proposal and rejection of legislative changes in the abuse of the
writ context was commonplace by the time of the proposed 1990 amendments. See
Note, Successive Chances for Life: Kuhlman v. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus, and the
Capital Prisoner, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 471 (1989)("Congress has repeatedly resisted legislative proposals that were inconsistent with the Sanders decision or that
would have otherwise restricted the availability of habeas corpus") (citing Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)); Berger, supra note 8, at 1667 ("... bills on the
subject of habeas have been introduced in every Congress since 1953") (footnote
omitted).
122 See Liebman, supra note 4, § 2.3, at 18-20 (Cum. Supp. 1991); Goldstein, supra
note 5; Berger, supra note 8.
123 See supra note 8.
124 H.R. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 120 (1990), reprinted in 8 U.S.
120
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ments were ultimately rejected, 25 and the abuse of the writ standard of Sanders
continued to be the law, although not uniformly
126
followed.
Recognizing the need to announce a clear standard for determining when a subsequent habeas petition is abusive of the
writ,' 27 the United States Supreme Court granted McCleskey's
petition for a writ of certiorari, 28 specifically commissioning the
parties to address whether anything short of the deliberate abandonment of a claim constitutes an abuse of the writ.' 29 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy'
focused on the standards
that have been applied for determining whether a petitioner has
abused the writ, and suggested that deliberate abandonment had
historically not been the sole measure of abuse.' 3 ' The Justice
6472, 6525 (1990). Proposed Section 1303 would
have prevented a petitioner from presenting newly discovered facts in a new-claim
successive petition unless the petitioner could demonstrate that those facts "could
not have been discovered previously by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Id.
125 See supra note 9.
126 See Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.7, at 417 (in circuits other than Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, and Eleventh, petitioner had to convince the district court that failure to
raise claim sooner was not deliberate or in bad faith; in southern circuits, petitioner
had to show that "omission was not objectively unreasonable given what the petitioner or counsel knew or should have known when the first petition was filed...").
For examples of decisions preceding McCleskey v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454 (1991),
that were faithful to the standard set forth in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963), see, e.g., Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) ("we must
look to Sanders to determine what constitutes an abuse of the writ"), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 854 (1990); Deutsher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989) (no
abuse of writ absent conscious decision to withhold claims); Nell v. James, 811 F.2d
100, 104-05 (2nd Cir. 1987) (requiring proof of actual knowledge, at time of first
petition, of facts supporting newly raised claim); United States ex rel. Cyburt v.
Lane, 612 F. Supp. 455, 458-60 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (criticizing 5th Circuit's objective
standard); United States ex rel. Oliver v. Zimmerman, 587 F. Supp. 18, 20 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (employing Sanders' subjective test).
127 The Court quoted the words ofJustice Frankfurter: "it is important.., to lay
down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits the standards or directions that should govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for
habeas corpus by prisoners under sentence of State Courts." McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501-02
(1953)).
128 McCleskey v. Zant, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990).
129 Id. See supra note 45.
130 Justice Kennedy was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter. McCleskey,
111 S. Ct. at 1457.
131 Id. at 1467. After tracing the history of the abuse of the writ jurisprudence,
Justice Kennedy concluded that "the doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions."
d. at 1462-67.
Although Justice Kennedy admitted that the Court's decisions in the area of abuse
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
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emphasized that, in the past, a petitioner who failed to raise a
claim in his first petition due to inexcusable neglect has been
held to have abused the writ.- 2 Finding the inexcusable neglect
standard too vague to guide lower courts, 13 3 however, the majority continued to enunciate that a subsequent habeas petition raising new grounds for relief will be dismissed unless the petitioner
demonstrates cause for not raising the claim earlier and preju3 4
dice resulting therefrom.1

The majority justified this application of the "cause and prejudice" standard, which was previously employed only in cases of
procedural default, by pointing out the similarities between the
procedural default and abuse of the writ doctrines. 3 5 Justice
Kennedy compared the nature and purpose of the respective
doctrines and noted that both impose procedural requirements
for habeas review and focus on the petitioner's conduct in determining whether the requirements have been satisfied. 13 6 Furthermore, the Justice cited the numerous costs that habeas
corpus inflicts on the judicial system, such as destroying the finality of judgments and burdening the scarce resources of the fedof the writ were not easily synthesized, he determined that "one point emerges with
clarity: Abuse of the writ is not confined to instances of deliberate abandonment."
Id.
132 Id. at 1468. In support of this conclusion, Justice Kennedy cited to Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1467-68. Because Townsend
applied an inexcusable neglect standard, and because Sanders held that the principles in Townsend also governed in an abuse of the writ analysis, Justice Kennedy
concluded that a petitioner could abuse the writ by not raising a claim due to inexcusable neglect. Id. at 1468. See supra note 77 for a discussion of Sanders and Townsend. In further support of this conclusion, the Court also cited a case from each of
the four southern circuits that had adopted the objective standard. McCleskey, 11
S. Ct. at 1468 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342, 346-47 (11 th Cir. 1989);
Hall v. Lockhart, 863 F.2d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Bordenkircher, 764
F.2d 245, 250-52 (4th Cir. 1985)); Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir.
1983)). See notes 113-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the adoption
of the inexcusable neglect standard in these four circuits.
Justice Kennedy also emphasized that both section 2244(b) and Rule 9(b) provide that a petitioner can otherwise abuse the writ without attempting to catalogue
the various ways in which this can occur. McCleskey, Il1 S. Ct. at 1466 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b)).
133 Id. at 1468. Justice Kennedy explained that the Court had not previously
given the inexcusable neglect standard the definition necessary to guide lower
courts in their consideration of allegedly abusive habeas petitions. Id.
134 Id. at 1470. The so-called cause and prejudice standard is a very difficult standard to meet. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 707.
135 MeCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1468-70.
136 Id. at 1468. The Court implied that one of the only differences between procedural default and abuse of the writ is that one involves default in state court and
the other applies upon default in the first federal habeas petition. See id.
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eral judiciary.' 3 7 Justice Kennedy emphasized that abuse of the
writ and procedural default jurisprudence have the common goal
of minimizing -these costs by weeding out baseless habeas
claims.' 3 8 Thus, the Justice concluded that "the standard for excusing a failure to raise a claim at the appropriate time should be
the same in both contexts. ' 3 9
The majority then explained the cause and prejudice standard in greater detail.' 40 The Court explained that to satisfy the
"cause" requirement, the petitioner must present evidence of an
external, objective factor that prevented the defense from raising
the claim previously in state court.' 4 ' The Court provided exam-

ples of possible causes for delay: conduct of officials that made
compliance with state rules impracticable accompanied by proof
that the claim's factual or legal basis was not available to the de137 Id. at 1468-69. Justice Kennedy noted that all habeas review undermines the
finality ofjudgments, a fundamental goal of the law. Id. To stress the importance
of finality, Justice Kennedy discussed the problems that arise when repetitive litigation is permitted. Id. First, the Justice maintained that the deterrent effect of the
criminal laws is almost eliminated when judgments are not final. Id. Additionally,
the Justice asserted that when successful petitions result in new trials, the government is prejudiced by fading memories and the inability to relocate witnesses. Id.
Furthermore, the Justice maintained that federal reexaminations of state court convictions offend the sovereign power of the states. Id. at 1469. Justice Kennedy emphatically reminded that "[o]ur federal system recognizes the independent power
of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State
to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them." d. Moreover, Justice
Kennedy explained that federal habeas corpus review burdens the scarce resources
of the federal courts. Id. Finally, the Justice cautioned that habeas review has the
potential for giving prisoners an incentive to withhold claims and manipulate the
court system. Id. All of these costs and disruptions are intensified further, the Justice charged, when a prisoner presents a new claim in a second or subsequent petition. See id.
138 Id. at 1469-70. Justice Kennedy recognized the need to overlook the costs
and disruptions of habeas review and grant a federal habeas corpus petition when a
petitioner presents meritorious constitutional claims. Id. at 1469. Both the procedural default doctrine and the abuse of the writ doctrine, the Justice explained,
provide the necessary "procedural regularity" for distinguishing unfounded claims
from valid ones. Id. Justice Kennedy advanced that both doctrines provide equitable principles to allow a petitioner to maintain a habeas claim if he legitimately
failed to fulfill pleading and procedural requirements despite exercising reasonable
diligence. Id. at 1469-70. Justice Kennedy, however, charged that both doctrines
similarly operate to deny review to claims in the interest of "vindicat[ing] the
State's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments." Id. at 1470.
139 Id. TheJustice opined that there exists a "unity of structure and purpose in
the jurisprudence of state procedural defaults and abuse of the writ." Id.
140 Id. at 1470-71.
141 Id. at 1470 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). See also
Daniel Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of FederalRights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986)
(discussing procedural default tests).
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fense, or constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. 142 The
Court continued, articulating that the prejudice requirement is
fulfilled if the petitioner shows he will suffer actual prejudice if
the alleged errors which resulted in his custody are not corrected.' 4 3 Finally, the Court qualified the cause and prejudice
standard by noting that if a petitioner fails to establish cause and
prejudice, a court may still issue a writ of habeas corpus in extraordinary instances where there has been a "fundamental mis44
carriage of justice.'
Next, the majority described how the cause and prejudice
14 5
standard should be applied in the abuse of the writ context.
The Court indicated that upon the filing of a second or subsequent petition, the government must plead abuse of the writ with
clarity and particularity.' 46 The petitioner then bears the burden
of disproving abuse.14 7 Justice Kennedy stated that for a court to
find the petitioner's failure to raise the claim previously to be excusable, the petitioner must demonstrate cause and prejudice as
defined in the procedural default jurisprudence. 148 Justice Kennedy further pointed out that the petitioner will not be granted
an evidentiary hearing to support his claim if the district court
determines that the standard cannot be satisfied as a matter of
law. 14 9 The Court added, however, that the petitioner's failure to
raise the claim earlier will be excused if it falls within the narrow
150
miscarriage of justice exception.
Justice Kennedy further justified the majority's holding on a
variety of other grounds. First, Justice Kennedy suggested that
the Court's decision is consistent with nearly all prior precedent.' 5 1 Next, the Justice emphasized that the cause and preju142 McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). The majority stated that "[aittorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause and will not constitute procedural default." Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 486-88).
143 Id. (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)).
144 Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 485).
145 Id. at 1470-71.
146 Id. at 1470.
147 Id.
148 Id. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
149 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. This will be much more common now that
those circumstances excusing the failure to previously assert a claim have been effectively narrowed to three objectively identifiable groups. Liebman, supra note 4,
§ 26.6, at 412.
150 Id. Sep supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1471 (citations omitted). The majority added that the
exception to the cause requirement for a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice defines
the otherwise inexplicable "ends ofjustice" inquiry. Id. Consistent with the plural-
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dice standard would bring certainty and stability to this area of
the law, and asserted that it is already well-defined and familiar to
district court judges. 152 Additionally, the objective nature of the
cause and prejudice standard, the majority maintained, is consistent with the threshold nature of the abuse inquiry.153 The Court
further asserted that the cause and prejudice standard will channel the discretion of the federal habeas courts, thereby achieving
greater national uniformity. 54 Finally, Justice Kennedy opined
that the adoption of the cause and prejudice standard in the
abuse of the writ context will curtail the abusive petitions which
have "in recent years threatened to undermine the integrity of
'
the habeas corpus process.' 55
The Justice concluded that the
Court's holding properly recognizes and balances the historic
purposes6 and functions of the writ, while also preventing its
5
abuse.'

In applying its newly adopted abuse of the writ standard to
McCleskey's second petition, the Court first considered whether
McCleskey had cause for not combining his first federal habeas
petition with the claim that his confession had been unconstitutionally obtained in the absence of counsel. 5 7 The majority recalled that McCleskey advanced this claim in the second federal
petition based solely upon the twenty-one page Evans statement.' 58 The Court inferred that the document's absence must
have been the reason for McCleskey's not raising the claim in the
first petition. 9 Thus, the Court questioned whether McCleskey
possessed or reasonably could have obtained a sufficient basis to
raise the claim in the first petition. 6 ° The Court stressed that if
McCleskey knew or should have known information that would
ity opinion in Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986), see supra note 75,Justice
Kennedy added, a petitioner who wishes to take advantage of this exception must
supplement a constitutional claim with some "colorable showing of factual innocence." Id. (quoting Kuhlman, 477 U.S. at 454).
152 Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the majority was incorrect in
asserting that the prejudice component of this analysis is well-defined. Id. at 1479
n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 1471 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 287 (1948)).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1472. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
158 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1472. Worthy, the jailer who testified for McCleskey
at the district court hearing, see supra note 40, was unknown to McCleskey and his
counsel when the second petition was filed. Id.
159 Id. (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (cause found if unavailability of evidence was reason for default)). Id.
160 See id.
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have supported the claim, his ignorance
of the twenty-one page
6
statement would be irrelevant.' '

In determining the importance of the Evans document to the
claim that McCleskey's confession had been unconstitutionally
obtained, Justice Kennedy distinguished McCleskey's knowledge
of the document itself from his knowledge of its contents. 162 The
Court emphasized that the district court's finding of a Massiah
violation rested wholly upon conversations in which McCleskey
was a participant. 63 Because of this participation, the Court
noted that McCleskey was always aware of the contents of Evans's
statement relied on by the district court. 64 The majority concluded that the unavailability of the document should not have
prevented McCleskey from alleging the Massiah violation in his
petition, and its absence therefore could not
first federal habeas
65
constitute cause.'

Although the Court did not consider whether McCleskey
would suffer prejudice by virtue of his not being able to raise the
Massiah claim in his second petition, 166 it did address the miscarriage of justice exception. 67 The majority asserted that even assuming that a violation of McCleskey's right to counsel did occur
because of the manner in which the confession was obtained, it
resulted merely in truthful inculpatory evidence being admitted
at trial and, therefore, determined that any such violation did not
affect the reliability of McCleskey's conviction.' 68 Justice Kennedy stated that McCleskey simply could not show that the alresulted in an innocent person being
leged violation
69
convicted.

1

Finally, the Court reiterated that the long history of the
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1473.
Id.
165 Id. Although Justice Kennedy based this conclusion upon the majority's assertion that McCleskey had knowledge of the information within the document, he
claimed that the district court's finding that the document was not reasonably discoverable at the time of the first petition was "not free from substantial doubt." Id.
at 1472. Justice Kennedy argued that strong evidence existed tending to prove that
McCleskey knew or reasonably should have known about the Evans document prior
to filing the first federal petition, but that he simply chose not to pursue it. Id. at
1473.
166 Id. at 1474 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (showing of
prejudice in the absence of cause does not permit relief)).
167 Id. at 1474-75.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1475.
161
162
163
164
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case,170 exemplified by the State's having to defend against allegations not raised in the previous federal habeas proceeding, in7
dicates why the abuse of the writ doctrine is so necessary.' '
Justice Kennedy offered assurance that the adoption of the cause
and prejudice standard would provide ample consideration of
constitutional errors in initial federal habeas proceedings, as well
as in second 72and subsequent petitions under appropriate

circumstances.'
In a caustic dissent, Justice Marshall' 73 vehemently decried
the adoption of the cause and prejudice standard in the abuse of
74
the writ context as a marked departure from past precedent.
The dissenters argued that the majority usurped the function of
and unfair,176
the legislature, 7 5 formed a standard both unwise
77
standard.'
adopted
newly
the
and misapplied
First, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's claim that it
was merely clarifying the inexcusable neglect standard and maintained that the majority broke away from all prior abuse of the
writ precedent.' 78 Previously, claimed the dissent the abuse of
the writ doctrine was governed by a good faith standard; a petitioner abused the writ only if he deliberately abandoned his
claim' 79 or used the writ tactically to harass or delay.' 8 0 Accord-

170 Id. at 1475-76. The majority included an appendix of McCleskey's many
claims for relief at different stages of the litigation. Id.
171 Id. at 1475.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1477 (MarshallJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined in dissent by
Justices Stevens and Blackmun. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 1477-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 1480-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 1483-86 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
177 Id. at 1486-89 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
178 Id. at 1477 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall claimed that the abuse of the
writ doctrine primarily attempts to prevent a petitioner from deleting claims,
known to have a legal and factual basis, from the first petition. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924)). Wong Doo is
discussed in supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
180 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1477. (Marshall, J., dissenting). While the majority
interpreted the "or otherwise abuse the writ" language of section 2244(b) as an
invitation to give content to the inexcusable neglect standard through the adoption
of the cause and prejudice test, id. at 1466, Justice Marshall argued that established
precedent already provided that a petitioner otherwise abused the writ if applications were filed for improper purposes-such as to harass or delay. Id. at 1478
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In 1988, Professor Liebman characterized the state of the
law in the following manner:
The rule governing new-claim successive habeas petitions that was developed in the 1920's, codified in 1948, authoritatively interpreted in
1963, and recodified in 1966 and 1976 is as follows: Successive peti-
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ing to the dissent, prior precedent dictated that the petitioner's
prior application
must have a good faith basis to avoid abuses of
1
the writ.'

8

The cause and prejudice standard, posited Justice Marshall,
imposes a much stricter standard than any previously suggested
in the abuse of the writ jurisprudence. 182 Justice Marshall
pointed out that under this test, a counsel's reasonable but mistaken belief that a claim is without either a legal or factual basis
will not justify the failure to raise the claim unless an objective,
external impediment hindered the counsel's efforts.18 3 Justice
Marshall argued that, unlike the good faith standard of Sanders
and its progeny, the cause and prejudice test establishes a strict
liability standard.' 84 Additionally, the dissent asserted that reprejudice was not traceable-to any
quiring a petitioner to 8prove
5
abuse of the writ case.1

After claiming that the majority's holding departed from established precedent, the dissent argued that the majority exceeded its judicial discretion to change the law. 18 6 Justice
tions presenting 'new or different grounds for relief' are permissible
so long as they do not 'constitute[] an abuse of the writ.' Abuse of the
writ occurs if the petitioner either (i) 'deliberately withheld the newly
asserted ground' from an earlier petition, or (ii) 'otherwise abused
the writ' because "his only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay."
Liebman, supra note 4, § 26.4, at 397 (footnotes omitted).
181 McCleskey, 11 S. Ct. at 1478 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the undoing of this good faith standard could not be justified by reliance
on the Court's more recent abuse of the writ decisions. Id. at 1479 n.2 (Marshall,J.,
dissenting). The dissent contended that the cursory analysis in these opinions
merely suggested that the petitioner failed to provide a credible explanation for not
raising the claim previously, and were in principle consistent with the Sanders test.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 1478-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that
under the cause standard, the state of mind of the prisoner's counsel is largely
irrelevant. Id. at 1479 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36
(1986)).
184 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained that under Sanders, if
a petitioner provided a justifiable excuse for not having raised the newly asserted
claim previously, that petitioner never had to prove any sort of prejudice for the
court to consider the claim. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)). Indeed, asserted the dissent, prior to McCleskey the State
bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a meritorious constitutional claim resulted merely in harmless error. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 1479-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Court
lacked discretion to exercise in the abuse of the writ context insofar as Congress
had insulated Sanders' good faith standard from judicial repeal in passing the governing procedural rules and statute. Id. at 1480 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Marshall agreed with the majority that section 2244(b) and
Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) codified Sanders' good faith standard,' 8 7
but rejected the majority's contention that Congress left the
courts with broad discretion to interpret the phrase "or otherwise abuse the writ." ' 88 The dissent explained that the cause and
prejudice standard completely subsumes the deliberate abandonment test to the extent it renders the petitioner's mental state,
which was the focus in deliberate abandonment analysis, wholly
irrelevant.' 89 Therefore, the dissent accused the majority of unjustifiably reading the deliberate abandonment test out of the
statute. 90 Justice Marshall argued that the phrase "or otherwise
abused the writ" should be narrowly interpreted only to prevent
a petitioner from intentionally filing a petition for some improper
purpose.' 9 '
Moreover, Justice Marshall noted that the Court had never
187 Id. at 1480-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In support of this conclusion, Justice
Marshall analyzed the legislative history of section 2244(b), and pointed out that
Congress' purpose was to prevent the hearing of second and subsequent petitions
" 'predicated upon grounds obviously well known to [the petitioner] when [he]filed the
preceding application.' " Id. at 1480 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3664). Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the legislative history
to Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases expressly stated an intent to codify Sanders. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521
(1982) ("The Advisory Committee to the Rules notes that Rule 9(b) incorporates
the judge-made principle governing the abuse of the writ set forth in Sanders...").
Finally, to further buttress this conclusion, the dissent cited lower court opinions
and scholarly commentary. McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1480 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
188 Id. at 1481 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority argued that because Congress did not attempt to catalogue all of the ways in which the writ could otherwise
be abused, it had the authority to give content to this phrase. Id. at 1466. See supra
note 132.
189 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1481 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that if a petitioner
must prove that some external impediment prevented him from bringing the claim
in the first petition, then the reference in § 2244(b) to deliberate withholding is necessarily rendered superfluous. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Given that Sanders focused on such deliberate, bad faith petitioning on the part of the prisoner, and
given Congress' intent to codify Sanders, Justice Marshall concluded that the Court
lacked the power to read this element out of the statute. Id. at 1481 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
191 Id. at 1481 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall suggested that by distinguishing in section 2244(b) deliberate withholding from other abuses, Congress
was tracking Sanders' identification of the two broad classes of petitions deserving of
dismissal, namely, petitions asserting claims deliberately withheld, and petitions intended to harass or delay. Id. at 1481 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, reasoned
Justice Marshall, if Congress expected that courts would give content to the phrase
"or otherwise abuse the writ," consistency requires that "such elaborations must be
confined to circumstances in which a petitioner's omission of an unknown claim is
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applied the inexcusable neglect standard in any abuse of the writ
decision, 92 and argued that even if inexcusable neglect could
constitute an independent abuse of the writ standard, giving it
content by adopting the cause and prejudice test could not be
defended. 9 3 Indeed, the dissent observed that the strict liability
standard adopted by the majority never excused mere attorney
negligence, 94 but requires constitutionally ineffective assistance
95
of counsel.1
The dissent further pointed to the recent congressional rejection of proposed amendments to section 2244(b), 196 and declared that the majority was acting as a backup legislature.' 97
conjoined with his intentional filing of a petition for an improper purpose, such as 'to
vex, harass or delay.' " Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 1481-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged that Sanders did compare its analysis with the analysis in Townsend v. Sain, and further admitted that Townsend established that a habeas petitioner who inexcusably neglected to
bring factual evidence in the state proceedings should be denied an evidentiary
hearing by the district court. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall emphasized, however, that the Townsend Court expressly equated the inexcusable neglect
standard that it employed with the deliberate bypass test set forth in Fay v. Noia. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Fay .v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). See supra note
77. Thus, Sanders' reference to Townsend incorporates an entirely subjective definition of inexcusable neglect in which deliberateness is still required. See Liebman,
supra note 4, § 26.6, at 410 (criticizing southern circuits' reasoning in basing adoption of objective inexcusable neglect standard on Sanders' reference to Townsend's
inexcusable standard). Accord Goldstein, supra note 5, at 116 ("To the extent the
inexcusable neglect standard may be premised on Sanders' reference to Townsend's
use of that phrase, this conclusion is misguided.") (footnote omitted). Moreover,
Justice Marshall pointed out that in passing Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases in 1976, Congress rejected a proposal that would have allowed a district court to dismiss a second or subsequent petition if it found that the failure to
assert the ground previously was "not excusable." McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1482 n.5
(Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1,
5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2478, 2481-82). The dissent explained that
this formulation was rejected and brought into conformity with Sanders because it
would have given judges "too broad a discretion" to dismiss a second or subsequent petition. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1471, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 5
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2478, 2482).
194 Id. at 1482 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under Sanders, mere negligence or the
simple failure "due to lack of knowledge or inadvertence on the prisoner's part or
some failing on counsel's part in which the petitioner did not 'knowingly and intelligently' concur" would not have constituted abuse of the writ. Liebman, supra note
4, § 26.4, at 398 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)).
195 McClkskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1482 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra notes 8-9.
197 McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1482. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
is axiomatic that this Court does not function as a backup legislature for the
"[ilt
reconsideration of failed attempts to amend existing statutes." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837 n.12 (1983); FTC v.
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The proposed amendments, Justice Marshall explained, would
have imposed a tougher "reasonable diligence" standard as a
means of preventing death row prisoners from filing additional
applications to extend litigation.' 98 Justice Marshall accused the
majority of repealing section 2244(b) on its own, despite Congress' decision to leave it unamended. t9 9
Next, the Justice argued that even if the majority could have
properly adopted the cause and prejudice standard without undoing the will of Congress, to do so was unwise. 20 0 The dissent
dismissed the importance the majority placed upon finality, declaring that the very purpose of the writ of habeas corpus has
always been to put conventional notions of finality aside if life or
liberty are threatened due to the alleged infringement of constitutional rights. 20 ' The dissent also dismissed the majority's attempt to analogize the procedural default and abuse of the writ
doctrines.20 2 Justice Marshall asserted that the two functions
served by the procedural default doctrine, promoting respect for
state-procedural rules 20 3 and preserving the incentive for state

courts to conduct criminal proceedings according to constitutional standards, 20 4 are simply not implicated in the abuse of the
writ analysis.20 5
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1952); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 534-35 (1982)).
198 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the rejected amendment would have only changed the standard for death row petitioners, while the
majority's holding applies to all habeas petitioners. Id. at 1482 n.7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
199 Id. at 1482 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 1483 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that to recognize the broad
purpose of the writ is not to require endless petitioning, but to protect " 'the practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts.' " Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-99 (1953)).
202 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 465 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)
(entertainment of claim in federal habeas that state court deemed procedurally
barred undercuts ability of State to enforce its own procedural rules)).
204 Id. at 1483-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
205 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall emphasized that the strictness
of the test applicable in the procedural default context has been justified based
upon the theory, not applicable in the abuse of the writ context, that a defendant's
procedural default is similar to an "independent and adequate state-law ground for
the judgment of the conviction." Id. at 1484 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-83 (1977)). Moreover, Justice Marshall argued that because the abuse of the writ doctrine assumes that a petitioner effectively raised the newly asserted claims in the state proceedings, a habeas court's
consideration of those claims manifests no disrespect for state procedural rules,
and does not unfairly subject state courts to collateral review of claims that the state
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Additionally, Justice Marshall maintained that the majority's
holding destroyed the established balance between finality and
proper habeas review. 2°6 First, the Justice noted that the petitioner's interest in liberty creates a powerful incentive to assert
all meritorious claims in the first petition, 0 7 and further asserted
that Sanders' bar on later bad faith claims sufficiently fortified this
natural incentive. 2°8 The dissent also declared that the majority's
holding upset the balance created by the successive petition doctrine, as petitioners will now assert all conceivable claims in the
first petition, rather than face the near-irrebuttable presumption
of the cause and prejudice standard. °9 Thus, the dissent contended, the majority's holding actually and unwisely promotes
not efficiency, but the assertion of baseless claims.21 0
In addition to finding the adoption of the cause and prejudice standard unwise, the dissent argued that its application in
the case at bar was wholly unfair.21 Justice Marshall argued that
the retroactive application of the new standard to McCleskey was
court has not yet heard. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall acknowledged that in many cases brought in a second or subsequent petition, the federal
court will have new evidence or a new legal theory before it that postdates the state
court proceedings, but he stressed that Congress expressly authorized petitioners
to avail themselves of habeas relief under precisely these circumstances. Id. at 1484
n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 1484-85 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall emphasized that the
abuse of the writ doctrine focuses on whether a federal habeas court should entertain a claim allegedly withheld from another such court, not a state court. Id. at
1485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The proper balance between review and finality, the
dissent contended, must be struck in that setting. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 1484-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that prior to McCleskey, a petitioner faced a disincentive to asserting claims lacking a reasonable
likelihood of success because the denial of such claims would make their reassertion
barred under the successive-petition doctrine. Id. at 1484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Thus, posited Justice Marshall, if new evidence invested the claim with merit, the
petitioner could bring it in a second petition. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall further advanced that under the cause and prejudice standard, however, a
petitioner will be forced to bring all conceivable claims in the first petition because
there will be virtually no expectation that a withheld claim might be brought later
should the assessment of the claim's merit subsequently prove erroneous. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall surmised that because the possibility of adverse adjudication will be more appealing than never again being able
to bring the claim in a subsequent petition, petitioners will be forced to advance
claims they themselves do not find wholly meritorious. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
211 Id. at 1485-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the rule
set out in McCleskey was not the governing standard when McCleskey filed his first
federal habeas petition in 1981. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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unjust, especially in light of the district court's express finding
that McCleskey's counsel conducted a reasonable investigation
before determining that the Massiah claim was without an adequate factual basis. 12
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that McCleskey in fact satisfied the cause requirement. 1 3 Justice Marshall ridiculed the
majority's reasoning in finding that because McCleskey participated in the conversations recounted in the disputed document,
the document's absence could furnish no viable excuse.21 4 Reiterating the central finding of the district court that the State did
in fact covertly place Evans in a cell adjacent to McCleskey to
elicit incriminating statements for use at trial, 215 Justice Marshall
emphasized that the State misled McCleskey throughout all pursuit of the unconstitutional confession claim.21 6 Stressing the importance of the actual existence of the document in backing up
McCleskey's testimony concerning the violation of his right to
counsel, Justice Marshall argued that without this evidence, and
against the backdrop of the state habeas court's dismissal of the
claim, McCleskey's counsel could have reasonably concluded that
2 17
raising the claim in the first petition would have been futile.

212 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall posited that prior to the majority's decision, the investigation and decision by McCleskey's counsel would have
satisfied Sanders' good faith test. Id. at 1485 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)). The dissent pointed out, moreover, that
McCleskey did not have a fair opportunity to confront the reasoning of the majority
because the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard was not litigated in
the lower courts, the State never requested that the Court adopt this standard, and
only the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae advanced such an argument. Id. at 1485 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this regard, Justice Marshall
pointed out that the Court does not consider arguments made by amicus when, as
here, the argument was not raised below and was not raised in the Supreme Court
by the party for whose benefit it was being raised. Id. at 1485-86 n. 10 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 n.13 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S.
361, 370 (1960)).
213 Id. at 1486-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Before turning to the cause analysis,
Justice Marshall argued that the majority should have remanded the case to the
lower court because the application of the newly adopted standard required such a
detailed, independent review of the record. Id. at 1486 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215 See supra note 40.
216 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1487 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the State's presentation of its complete file to McCleskey's counsel failed
to include the Evans statement. Id. at 1487 n. 11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further,
Justice Marshall noted, numerous state officials responsible for Evans' confinement
denied knowledge of any agreement between the State and Evans. Id. at 1487
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall declared that without the state-
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Justice Marshall declared that the statement provided the credible and independent corroboration necessary to make McCleskey's claim that his confession had been unconstitutionally
obtained in the absence of counsel worth pursuing.21 8
While acknowledging that no external obstacle totally barred
McCleskey's counsel from pursuing this claim, Justice Marshall
argued that the dishonesty of the state officials caused McCleskey's counsel to feel confident in focusing his attention on other
claims.21 9 Justice Marshall further asserted that by not including
in its cause analysis any consideration of the effect that the State's
dishonesty had upon the defense counsel's pursuit of the claim,
the majority promoted the State's misconduct.22 °
Finally, the dissent concluded that because Evans's testimony was critical to the State's case, 2 2 1 McCleskey was clearly
prejudiced by the presentation of Evans's unconstitutionally obtained statements.222 Even under the cause and prejudice test,
Justice Marshall concluded, McCleskey should have been permitted to bring his second petition and have the claim
entertained.223
In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court was called upon to balance the
need for finality in the criminal justice and death penalty
ment, the only evidence supporting the Massiah violation was McCleskey's own testimony. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 1487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stressed that "the
importance of the statement lay much less in what the statement said than in its
simple existence." d. at 1487 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The existence of the statement, added Justice Marshall, not only provided a reasonable expectation of success in pursuing the Massiah claim, but provided the clues that led to the discovery
of Worthy, McCleskey's lead witness. Id. at 1488 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
219 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
[B]y withholding the 21-page statement and by affirmatively misleading counsel as to the State's involvement with Evans, state officials
created a climate in which McCleskey's first habeas counsel was perfectly justified in focusing his attentions elsewhere. The sum and substance of the majority's analysis is that McCleskey had no 'cause' for
failing to assert the Massiah claim because he did not try hard enough
to pierce the State's veil of deception.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221 See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
222 McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1488 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that, without Evans' testimony, the jury could have easily reached a different
verdict. d. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that whether McCleskey
satisfied the cause and prejudice standard was certainly a close enough question to
warrant a remand to allow the parties to fully and fairly brief the issue. Id. at 148889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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processes with the claim that notions of finality should be mitigated if not displaced when meritorious constitutional claims are
presented and life is at stake. 4 In striking this balance, the
Court failed to give effect to the governing statutes and its own
precedent, and it also placed an unjustifiable and unnecessary
burden on petitioners seeking the relief offered by the writ of
habeas corpus, and in particular, on petitioner McCleskey.
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority,225 the cause and
prejudice standard as developed in the procedural default context is inconsistent with the standard set forth in Sanders and subsequently

codified

by

Congress.2 2 6

The Sanders standard

required that a petitioner prove that a claim asserted in a newclaim successive petition had not been deliberately withheld, and
that the claim had not been omitted to harass or delay the judicial
process.2 2

7

Under the cause prong of the newly-adopted stan-

dard, a petitioner must show that some objective factor made it
impossible to bring the claim in the first petition. 228 . Thus, a petitioner who in good-faith did not bring a claim that objectively
could have been brought previously was permitted to bring the
new claim under Sanders and its codification, but will not be able
to bring the claim under McCleskey unless the significant hurdle of
the cause standard is met. 9
Reduced to its essence, the majority's argument offered two
justifications for its new interpretation of Sanders and the governing statutes: the inexcusable neglect language of Townsend referred to in Sanders, and the supposedly open-ended "otherwise
abuse the writ" language 23 0 of the statute. 23 ' These bases do not
224 For differing viewpoints on the proper weight to be given these competing
concerns, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Yackle, supra note 1; Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142
(1970).
225 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 134-36 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 80, 95, 191 & 194 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
231 The majority also discussed in some detail the similarity of the policies served
by the cause and prejudice standard and the abuse of the writ jurisprudence in
attempting to address the costs and disruptions of federal habeas review. See supra
notes 141-54 and accompanying text. The better view of this debate is that the
strictness of the standard applied in the procedural default context has been based
upon a petitioner's default being analogous to an independent state-law ground for
the judgment, a theory inapplicable in the abuse context. See supra note 205. Regardless, the point to be made is that a policy justification by the majority presup-
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withstand scrutiny; indeed, upon close examination, the majority's argument reflects an utter and wholly result oriented intellectual dishonesty.

23 2

In understanding the majority's first justification, it must be
emphasized that the inexcusable neglect language in Townsend,
which was consistent with Fay and Sanders, has almost universally
been understood to refer to a petitioner's deliberate choice, not
his or her negligent mistake.233 Despite this, the majority simply
takes the inexcusable neglect language from Townsend, and without explanation states that this standard demands more from a
petitioner than the deliberate withholding standard.23 4 Moreover, the majority's citation to four opinions by Circuit Courts of
Appeals,23 5 each of which offered explanations for adopting an
objective inexcusable neglect standard as unsatisfying as its
own, 2 3 6 cannot justify the departure.
The majority's second basis for its new interpretation, that
Congress had not answered all of the questions regarding other
types of abuse, is similarly unpersuasive. The majority failed to
admit the implications of its admission that the governing statutes codified Sanders. This allowed it to exercise substantial discretion where it had previously been narrowly circumscribed.23 7
In fact, Sanders and its progeny established that a petitioner
otherwise abuses the writ when using it for an improper purpose,
such as to harass or delay. 23 8 Although deliberateness is pre-

cisely what is proscribed by the Sanders standard, the cause and
prejudice test renders an inquiry into the defendant's state of
mind wholly superfluous. 23 9 It cannot be doubted that a significant percentage of new-claim successive petitions that would
have been entertained under Sanders will be dismissed under
McCleskey.
The Court's aggressive application of its newly adopted stanposes that it had the power to alter the governing abuse of the writ standard. This
presupposition was not adequately defended.
232 In the words ofJustice Brennan: "[riesult, not reason, propels the Court today." Butler v. McDellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233 See supra notes 77 & 132 and accompanying text.
234 See id.
235 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
236 See supra 113-20 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 94 & 201 and accompanying text.
238 See id.
239 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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dard was similarly unjustifiable.2 4° Although the Court quoted
extensively from the district court opinion,2 4 1 it failed to include
that court's finding that McCleskey dropped the claim that his
confession had been unconstitutionally obtained in the absence
of his counsel from his first habeas corpus petition "because it
was obvious that it could not succeed given the then-known
facts. 2 42 The Court eschewed this futility argument, however,
and found that McCleskey was not actually prevented from bringing
this claim.2 43
Thus, under the majority's holding, McCleskey could have
brought the claim in the first petition, failed, gained access to the
document, reasserted the previously adjudicated claim, and had
it barred unless he could supplement it with a showing of factual
innocence. 44 Or, McCleskey could have, as he did, omitted the
claim from his first petition because of the lack of an adequate
factual basis, gained access to the document, asserted the claim
in a new-claim petition, and had it barred because he had not
been absolutely prevented from bringing it previously.24 5 Such a
situation presents a defendant with no meaningful option, and
places an unjustifiable burden on good-faith petitioner's seeking
habeas relief 2 46 Significantly, the very reason for this situation in
McCleskey's case was the fact that the State did not 24disclose
Ev7
ans' statement to the defense in its "complete" file.
If the traditional purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to
ensure that individuals were not unjustly deprived of life or liberty, then McCleskey v. Zant surely signals the end of a tradition.
The majority's motivation became apparent when it stated that
its holding will inevitably curtail the abusive petitions which have
"in recent years threatened to undermine the integrity of the
habeas corpus process. ' 248 However, in an abuse of the writ that
completely overshadows any engaged in by Mr. McCleskey, the
majority curtailed a great deal more - good faith petitions alleging meritorious constitutional claims that for justifiable reasons,
though not for "cause", could not have been brought previ240 See Freedman, supra note 19, at S6 ("Indeed, the saga of Warren McCleskey
some day may come to symbolize criminal justice in the Rehnquist era.").
241 See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1460-61 (1991).
242 See supra note 39.
243 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
244 See supra note 75.
245 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 209-10 and accompanying text.
247 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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The Court should take note of Justice Frankfurter's
warning issued almost forty years ago: "Under the guise of fashioning a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping out the
practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the
District Courts. 2 5 °
It must be urged that Congress should, in its recognition of
the habeas corpus legislation, strike a better balance than did the
Court. If the Sanders standard allowed too many generally abusive petitions to be entertained, the cause and prejudice standard
will assuredly require the dismissal of too many petitions genuinely deserving review. A proper balance requires that a petitioner who asserts any new claims for relief in a second or
subsequent petition prove that the newly asserted grounds had
not been deliberately withheld, were not omitted to harass or delay the judicial process and did not exhibit reckless indifference
to the orderly administration of justice.2 5 ' Such a standard
would maintain the essence of Sanders, preserve the traditional
discretionary nature of the determination and allow a reasonable
objective element to prevent against genuine abuse into the
court's decision. If Congress were to create such a realistic burden, the writ would be preserved against potential abuse by both
the Court and bad faith defendants.
Paul C. Gluckow
See supra note 212.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-99 (1952).
The last part of this test was recommended by Goldstein, supra note 8, at 122
(footnote omitted). Congress' consideration of this issue should also come to
terms with whether the same rules will apply to cases that involve the death penalty
and cases that do not. Clearly, the incentive to extend litigation attributed to defendants under a sentence of death should not be transposed to other defendants.
At the same time, however, strong arguments exist as to why defendants petitioning under a sentence of death should be held to a less demanding standard. See, e.g.
Goldstein, supra note 8, at 120-22 (arguing that when "a person's life is in the balance," courts should take extraordinary care and consider the validity of the claims
with greater scrutiny.).
249
250
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